Ah, but what of his theory? Not completely clear to me, though I should probably be making a list of what I regard as his insights.
I am puzzled, however, by the possibilities latent in the Platonic/Socratic metaphor of vision of The Good. Let us suppose that The Good is present in the mind's eye, yet our vision may be cloudy, or The Good may not be in the foreground of our mental-visual field.
If you are troubled by the expression "The Good" this is an English translation of Plato's greek, and it means something abstract, which has much of the character of a law of nature, but in the realm of human happiness--like a natural law in being independent and objective.
Frijda works with a characteristically contemporary divide between rather quick thoughts or reactions and more deliberate or deliberative ones. (This is not his vocabulary.)
It is interesting that he points out that ethical decisions can be made very quickly without much thought. (And his example is the case of individuals in Nazi-occupied Holland who decided to hide Jews from the Nazis.) Usually, I tend to think the quick decisions go in a less sophisticated direction--such as running away from a bear. (An example popular in the literature, which I guess may come from William James, but is itself mentioned by Frijda as not probably a good example to have as the prototypical emotion!)
But my aporia (puzzlement) is this: to what extent are the emotional strategies discussed by Frijda--e.g., a man in a concentration camp who decided not to let himself think of himself as a victim, and advising "a fellow inmate not to pick up and eat potato peels from the mud."--an example of knowing the value of things, or possessing something like a Socratic "measuring science"--a way of knowing what is of more and what of less good, what is more harmful and what less harmful?
On the surface if we talk of what's better and what's worse, perhaps we are tempted by a to concrete visual image--more and less..But why couldn't knowing that by doing this I will lose a certain perspective itself be part of knowing how to live? Socrates was fond of the comparison between virtue/knowing how to live and physical training. If life is not worth living with a diseased body, then it is even less worth living if the part of us which lets us decide and act wisely is damaged. What is the part of us that lets us decide and act wisely? Translations use the word "soul" here but that's likely to be confusing. The thing in question isn't a Christian soul. (Nor do I suppose that the historical Socrates was especially an advocate of the immortality of the soul....) Isn't the concentration camp survivor's wisdom knowledge of what's worth choosing and what's worth avoiding? Can't we describe it in a way that seems more Socratic? And can our descriptions seem fair? (not distortions)
There is an interest in these sorts of self-manipulation that goes beyond Frijda. I suppose there is something real here. But is it an act of will? I decide: I won't let myself think of myself as a victim? Or, is it a matter of mental focus on something like justice or my life?--a mental focus on doing justice to myself? (I like the visual language here. I think it can do work.) It may require a kind of mental energy, but so too does simple looking. On the other hand, one's eye can be drawn to something, and then one can concentrate on it, study it (or one can let one's attention wander)...
In Plato's "Protagoras" the character of Socrates' suggests that the thing needed to be happy would be a sort of science of measurement (metrike technike). People who say they've been "overcome" by pleasure lack that science. The connection with emotion is easy to make. People say they did the wrong thing because of their emotions. That's what interests Frijda (and interested Solomon).
Can I fairly regard the sorts of processes mentioned by Frijda as part of a Socratic measuring science? I don't know.
Offhand, I am not inclined to reject Socrates' thinking with the claim that weakness of the will is simply a fact, or that pleasure can overcome us. To some degree, the phenomena which interest Frijda in this essay (and which interested Robert Solomon when he argued the emotions can be strategic) fall in the same area as Socrates' discussion of whether knowledge could be overcome by pleasure. The original text in Plato, however, is more complicated than I've allowed for here, and there is much more to say and think. I also should probably mention that so far as historical influences go, Frijda himself draws inspiration from Spinoza. Nonetheless, at a broad level, Frijda and Solomon agree that we are not slaves to passion--and that doesn't seem so terribly different from Socrates complaint that knowledge cannot be dragged about by pleasure. Perhaps, it raises the question (again): are the strategic processes described by Frijda anything like what can reasonably interpret Socrtates to mean by "knowledge"--the knowledge needed for "virtue" and happiness? Above I've made some baby steps in the direction of saying yes--but without further thought I don't want to confidently say "yes". It would be very unfortunate if I ignored differences between Socrates and the contemporary thinkers. It would also be an error to neglect details. But that is a task I cannot undertake tonight.
Reference
"Not Passion's Slave", Nico H. Fridja, Emotion Review, (2010) Vol. 2, No. 1, 68-75
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